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Abstract. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) play an important role in
the monitoring, control and automation of critical infrastructure such as
water, gas, oil and electricity. Recent years have seen a number of high
profile cyber attacks on such infrastructure exemplified by Stuxnet and
the Ukrainian Power Grid attacks. This naturally begs the question: how
should we manage cyber security risks in such infrastructure on which
the day-to-day functioning of societies rely? What are the complexities
of managing security in a landscape shaped by the often competing de-
mands of a variety of stakeholders, e.g., managers, control engineers,
enterprise IT personnel and field site operators? What are the challenges
posed by the convergence of Internet of Things (IoT) and critical infras-
tructure through the so-called Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)? In
this paper, we discuss insights from a multi-year programme of research
investigating these issues and the challenges to addressing them.
Keywords: Cyber security · Industrial control systems · Critical infras-
tructure · Industrial IoT · Cyber risk decisions.
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructure systems, e.g., water, power, etc. are increasingly being
connected to other enterprise systems for a variety of reasons. These range from
the need to remotely update and maintain systems, reducing the effort, time and
cost of visiting remote, hard to access facilities through to the desire to gain real-
time business intelligence in order to optimise processes and improve efficiencies.
Consequently, the past assumption that such systems are air-gapped from wider
networks, and the Internet, is increasingly being proven to no longer be valid.
Unintentional connections are also an increasing issue, with poorly configured
controls allowing outside connections to individual control devices. For instance,
⋆⋆ Current affiliation. The author conducted the work while employed by the Bristol
Cyber Security Group.
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a browse though the Shodan search engine of Internet connected devices shows
a large number of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) from various manu-
facturers. As we note above, increasingly, these connections to external systems,
and the Internet, are being introduced intentionally for remote connectivity and
configuration capabilities or other business needs. This results in a number of
risks to critical infrastructures as a consequence of an increased cyber-attack
surface.
As we build more and more complex large, connected environments, the
scale of connectivity and complexity of such enrivonments will only increase
further—resulting in increased scale of attacks and impact. The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that often critical infrastructures have multiple organi-
sations that collectively contribute to the environment, e.g., power producers
and power distribution networks are often owned by different organisations not
to mention the large number of organisations that form the supply chain. The
infrastructures remain in operation over a long lifespan and their make-up (de-
vices, software, communication protocols) changes over time, often resulting in a
large number of legacy and non-legacy systems working in conjunction to deliver
critical services to citizens.
For instance, we are seeing the emergence of multiple products and services
on the market that allow for data from industrial environments to be sent to
the cloud for processing, allowing remote monitoring of processes, under the
banner of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and Industry 4.0. The latest push
is to move onto SCADA-in-the-cloud, where more and more control functions
are moved into the remote cloud environment. This transition results in ICS
equipment becoming Internet-of-Things devices, with indirect connections to IT
networks and the wider Internet—providing a route for attackers to gain access
to these devices through compromise of the cloud environment.
Cyber security risks, therefore, need to be managed in the face of these new
attack vectors and increased attack sophistication whereby highly resourced ad-
versaries may disrupt critical services to large parts of the population. Managing
such risks is, however, non-trivial for three reasons:
– Risk is a socio-technical construct—requiring not only an understanding of
the technical threat landscape but also organisational and human dimensions
of risk and risk decision-making.
– Risks arising from both legacy and non-legacy systems need to be understood
especially those that emerge from the convergence of the two.
– Such understanding needs to be developed through direct engagement with
the stakeholders and experimentation on realistic infrastructures. The former
is often challenging due to the sensitive nature and confidentiality cultures
within critical infrastructure organisations. The latter cannot be achieved
through experimentation on production environments (as this can lead to
disruption to the infrastructure), hence requiring realistic testbeds that en-
able modelling and experimentation of non-trival attack scenarios.
In this paper, we discuss insights from a multi-year programme of research in-
vestigating both social and technical dimensions of cyber security risks in critical
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infrastructures. We first summarise (Section 2) insights from our prior work [4,
5] to discuss the human and organisational dimensions of cyber risks. We then
move onto the technical aspects of the problem and particularly the risks arising
from convergence of IIoT and ICS environments. We describe the Bristol Cyber
Security Group (BCSG) testbed (Section 3) followed by detailed discussion of
an attack (Section 4) against an ICS environment (set up using our testbed)
which utilises a cloud provider. We exploit the connection from the operational
network to the cloud to provide a tunnel through which we can gain access to
the control equipment. Through this access we force the physical process, a wa-
ter treatment plant, to enter an unsafe state by disabling a pressure alarm and
increasing he speed of the primary pump.
2 Human and Organisational Dimensions of Cyber Risk
In prior work [5], we analysed a number of high profile attacks against industrial
control systems (including those impacting critical infrastructures) and high-
lighted that perception errors play a key part in attack success. These perception
errors relate to four dimensions (Figure 1):
System qualities Operators may have incorrect perceptions of particular qual-
ities of the system, e.g., confidentiality, integrity, availability, resilience, etc.
This may lead them to think that the system can withstand particular faults
or recover gracefully when this may not be the case in reality.
System boundaries Operators may have incorrect perceptions a system’s iso-
lation (physical or virtual) from other systems. This, in turn, may lead the
operators to assume that lateral movement across systems or from less criti-
cal to mission critical systems is not possible when this may not be the case
in reality.
Observability Operators may assume that, at a particular point in time, their
observation of system behaviour is accurate and complete.
Controllability Operators may assume that, even under attack conditions,
they maintain control of the system especially safety-critical components.
However, these perception errors often arise due to latent design conditions [9]
– improper specification of system qualities, borders, observability and control-
lability – during conception, design, implementation or evolution. These latent
design conditions are further exacerbated when the attacker actively tampers
with the observation and control link between the operators and the system.
A number of stakeholder decisions shape security within such a system, and
by consequence, may lead to latent design conditions. Previously, we designed
a game, Decisions & Disruptions1 and analysed the decision-making processes
of three different stakeholder groups: managers, computer science/IT experts
and security experts [4]. The game (see Figure 2) charges a team of players to
defend a hydro-electric power producer (represented by a Lego R© board) against
1 https://www.decisions-disruptions.org
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Fig. 1. Dimensions of cyber risk perception
cyber attacks. Players invest in various defences over four game rounds. Attacks
occur during each round and their success depends on the defences in which the
players have invested. However, the players have a limited budget in each round
(unspent budget carries over to the next round) so they must prioritise and
choose amongst the different types of defences. These range from basic defences
such as firewalls, anti-virus and security training to more advanced network
monitoring solutions. Players can also seek to gain intelligence by paying for a
threat assessment and an asset audit. The game is available under a CC-BY-NC
license and all the cards, a Bricklink model the Lego R© and the rule book are all
available on the website.
Fig. 2. An overview of the Decisions & Disruptions game board
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Our analysis of twelve teams representing the three stakeholder groups: man-
agers, computer scientists/IT personnel and security experts from academia and
industry has highlighted a number of interesting patterns. We briefly summarise
these below. Readers are referred to [4] for a detailed discussion:
– Security experts favoured advanced cyber security protection measures, e.g.,
the advanced network monitoring product (effectively a very expensive intru-
sion detection system) and often deprioritised basic protections (e.g., fire-
walls, anti-virus and patching) and intelligence gathering (e.g., threat as-
sessment or asset audits). Their discussions were scenario-driven (e.g., what
if . . . ) and they had high confidence in their decisions – even when these
decisions led them to catastrophic outcomes.
– Computer scientists, by contrast, focused more substantially on intelligence
gathering and human factors (e.g., security training) and deprioritised ad-
vanced cyber security protection measures. However, they also deprioritised
data protection – a fundamental requirement for information security. They
used diverse strategies during decision-making but expressed low confidence
in their decisions even those that subsequently successfully deflected attacks.
– Managers, on the other hand, did prioritise data protection along side ba-
sic cyber security protection whilst also favouring advanced cyber security
technologies. However, they paid less attention to human factors. Their de-
cisions were very much intuition-driven (e.g., I like the firewall) and they
too exhibited low confidence in their choices.
The analysis also showed that security experts did not necessarily always
perform the best. There were also a number of good, bad and ugly decision-
making patterns that stakeholders should look out for when making decisions
about cyber seurity in an organisation. These are detailed in [4].
Having summarised human and organisational aspects of cyber security in
critical infrastructure settings from prior work, in the rest of the paper, we
discuss a concrete scenario emerging from the convergence of tranditional control
systems (so-called operational technology (OT)) and Industrial IoT platforms
and devices and demonstrate how this leads to an increased attack surfance and
successful attacks.
3 Testbed
Before we discuss the details of the attack, we provide a brief overview of the
testbed environment that is under attack. For a more detailed discussion of the
testbed we refer the reader to [6].
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3.1 Physical process
The primary physical process of the BCSG testbed, and the target of the de-
scribed attack, is the Gunt CE581 water treatment plant2, as seen in Figure 3.
The CE581 system, designed for the training of water treatment engineers, con-
sists of a three-stage filtration, absorption and ion-exchange process. The CE581
physical aspect is largely off–the-shelf, however we had the unit customised with
safety valves to release system pressure when under attack, and added a remov-
able copper pipe between the filtration and absorption stages to allow for the
easy installation and removal of additional sensors.
The CE581 initially utilised a small Eaton PLC for control. By using swap-
pable terminal blocks, we replaced the control equipment with our own control
architecture. This allows us to utilise equipment that more closely represents
real-world scenarios. This architecture is discussed in Section 3.2. The original
control equipment can be made operational with minimal effort if required for
maintenance.
The system has five controllable elements: the pump and 4 electronically
operated valves to control the flow of water though the three stages. The system
also has a number of sensors, including a pressure alarm, differential pressure
across the filtration tanks and temperature sensors.
Normal operation Under normal operation, the system operates with the
pump set at 80% speed utilising all three stages of the treatment process. Under
these conditions, the system runs with around 1.55 bar of internal pressure. If
the pump speed is increased past 90%, the system pressure increases above 1.6
bar. If this occurs, the pressure sensor sends an alarm signal to the PLC, and
the logic deactivates the pump. After a few seconds, the pressure will drop below
1.3 bar and the alarm will terminate, allowing the pump to restart. If the pump
speed is not reduced, the system will repeatedly exceed the pressure limit, shut
down and then restart,
3.2 Control Equipment
We now describe the different pieces of control equipment that control the water
treatment process. The control equipment is connected via ethernet to a West-
ermo industrial switch, which provides communication between devices and to
other services.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) The primary PLC for the water
treatment plant is a modern Siemens S7-1500. This unit controls the electronic
valves and pump speed, as well as receiving inputs from the various sensors on
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Key:





6 Original control panel, replaced by field site board
7 Safety bunds
8 IO cabling to field site board
9 Removable copper pipe for sensor installation
Fig. 3. Water treatment process
pump on-off state. This mix of older (more vulnerable) and newer devices allows
us to examine the convergence of old and new devices.
Human machine interfaces (HMIs) The operator HMI is a wireless Siemens
panel (MobilePanel 277 IWlAN V2). This is connected to the field site network
over WiFi using a Mikrotik access point. The screen can be seen in Figure 5a.
Remote telemetry unit (RTU) Telemetry is provided through a SCADA-
pack32 from Schneider, which communicates with the ClearSCADA software.
3.3 Networks
An overview of the network architecture is presented in Figure 6. The network is
divided into the IT and operational (OT) networks. These are, in turn, divided
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Key:
1 & 2 Digital Inputs\Outputs (32 each)
3 & 4 Analogue Inputs\Outputs (16 each)
5 & 6 Secondary PLC\RTU Housing
7 Primary Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)
8 Primary Remote Terminal/Telemetry Unit
9 24VDC Distribution
10 WiFi Access Point
11 L3 Managed Ethernet Switch
12 Firewall
13 240VAC to 24V DC Power Supplies
14 Ethernet Back-haul to Core Network Infrastructure
15 IO Cabling to Physical Process
Fig. 4. Field Site Control Board
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(a) HMI (b) ClearSCADA
Fig. 5. HMI and ClearSCADA screens
Fig. 6. Testbed network diagram
into multiple subnets, with each assigned its own /24 address space. Along-
side the IT and OT networks there exists an experimental network which has
a primary function of allowing researchers access to the testbed for experimen-
tation and maintenance. For example, all virtual machines have a connection
to the management network to allow for easy RDP access. Subnets are mapped
to VLANs for allowing access by virtual machines. Each individual field site
(physical process and associated control equipment) is assigned its own field site
network.
The network is configured with multiple spanning networks to allow for net-
work captures across any of the individual subnets within the network.
3.4 Software
All software is installed within virtual machines on a single server running
VMWare vSphere. Each piece of software is installed within its own virtual
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machine, which is, in turn, attached to an appropriate set of VLANs to insert
the machine into the network architecture.
ClearSCADA from Schneider3 is used to display telemetry data to the oper-
ations centre. ClearSCADA communicates with the Scadapack32 RTU over the
Modbus and DNP3 industrial protocols and sits within the OT-Utility network.
A basic example display can be seen in Figure 5b.
KEPServerEX from Kepware4 (henceforth referred to as Kepware) is a data
historian which sits inside individual field site networks with direct access to the
control hardware. It can read and write data to these devices, and send it on to
higher level services, including public cloud services. Kepware is installed within
a Windows 7 virtual machine with an installation deployed within each field site
network.
The primary cloud service that we use is Thingworx5 from PTC (who now
also own Kepware), a cloud-based IIoT platform. Through a connection to Kep-
ware, apps can be developed to run on the Thingworx platform with data from
the control devices. Thingworx is deployed within an Ubuntu virtual machine
running Tomcat 8.5, as configured by the supplier. An example Thingworx ap-
plication for the water process can be seen in Figure 8a.
4 Attack Overview
The physical process under attack is the water treatment plant as seen in Fig-
ure 3, with the control equipment mounted onto an specially designed board, as
seen in Figure 4. The goal of the attack is to cause the water treatment process
to enter into an unsafe state.
The overall conceptual architecture for the attack demonstration can be seen
in Figure 7. Data aggregation from the testbed is performed by the Kepware
data aggregation platform. In the deployment for the attack scenario, Kepware
resides within a Microsoft Windows 7 VM, located within the OT DMZ network
on the field site for the water treatment process, communicating directly with
the devices on its related control board.
The IIoT cloud platform for the demonstrator is Thingworx, which supports
the development of web-based applications utilising IIoT data. The manufactur-
ers of Thingworx (PTC) acquired Kepware in 2016, and since have marketed
Kepware and Thingworx as an IIoT solution, with Kepware providing data in-
puts to the Thingworx platform.
Thingworx is deployed on top of an Ubuntu virtual machine (supplied pre-
built by PTC) and uses Apache Tomcat 8.5 as its underlying platform. Our
deployment operates Thingworx within a virtual cloud (i.e. inside our closed
testbed environment). A trusted communication link between Kepware and Thing-
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Fig. 7. Testbed environment for SecCNIoT demonstrator
(a) Thingworx (b) Attack script
Fig. 8. Thingworx and attack script
4.1 Anatomy of the attack on the OT-IIoT environment
We now discuss the anatomy of the attack we have implemented on this con-
verged OT-IIoT environment as modelled within our testbed. It is an evolution
of our previous work on attacks in ICS environments [7]. The flow of the attack
can be seen in Figure 9.
(1) Compromise Thingworx The first step is to compromise the cloud ma-
chine hosting Thingworx. As mentioned, Thingworx was delivered pre-installed
inside an Ubuntu virtual machine running on Tomcat 8.5. Tomcat is well known
for having multiple security vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited to gain
access to the host. Once access to the host is gained, through a vulnerability
in Tomcat or other process, then the attacker loads a copy of the attack script
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Fig. 9. Attack process. indicates communication over the proxy
onto the host. The attack script, as seen in Figure 8b, is a simple python script
utilising command line tools such as nmap and the Step7 python libraries.
(2) Terminate Thingworx On gaining access to the machine, the attacker
first takes Thingworx oﬄine by terminating the Tomcat process. This will mean
Kepware can no longer communicate with the Thingworx server and will display
an error.
(3) Setup HTTP listener The attacker now starts an HTTP listener on the
Thingworx host, ready for receiving a connection from within the OT network
in the next step.
(4) Compromise Kepware host The attacker now requires an engineer to
open a connection back to the Thingworx host from the Kepware host. As Kep-
ware is now throwing error messages due to a failed connection to Thingworx,
the engineer is likely to inspect the machine. Prior to the attack, the attacker
would have replaced the Kepware manual, an Adobe PDF held on the Kepware
host, with one which they have modified to contain a malicious payload. Whilst
we take the liberty of doing this manually for the purposes of the demonstration,
processes by which such a file might make it to a server, or an engineer’s trusted
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workstation, are many and varied including USB drives, internet download, an
injection into the supply chain (akin to the 2019 malware attack on Asus6) or a
direct hack of the workstation itself.
In trying to fix the communication error, the engineer opens the malicious
PDF file which, whilst appearing to open as normal for the engineer, executes
the attacker’s payload.
(5) Open reverse HTTP connection and set up proxy On opening the
malicious PDF, the payload opens a reverse HTTP connection back to the Thing-
worx host, connecting to the listener started in step (3). As Kepware already
communicated with the Thingworx host over HTTP, this connection is trusted
and allowed through any firewalls. The attacker then. sets up a proxy connection
through this HTTP link, and pipes all actions from their attack through this
proxy, allowing them access to the control devices accessible from the Kepware
host.
(6) Enumerate devices Once access has been gained to the ICS devices, the
first stage is to enumerate these devices. In the first instance nmap can be used
to perform a port scan across the field site network. This should give the attacker
a list of devices, and open ports. From the open ports the attacker can gain some
insight into the manufacturers of each device. For example, devices with port 102
open indicate Step7, which is the primary protocol in use by Siemens devices.
Specific tools can then be used to gain precise information about device
hardware and software. As en example, PLCScan7 can be used to gain details
on older Step7 and modbus devices. For newer devices, there are nmap scripts
as well as vulnerability scanners, e.g., [1, 2], available for collecting the same
information. Returned information includes the hardware and firmware versions,
and device name (as set by the operator). Knowing the hardware and firmware
version allows the attacker to find publicly known vulnerabilities in the devices.
At this stage the attacker could use a known exploit to carry out, for example,
a denial-of-service attack. In this scenario we go further to show how an attacker
could have a controlled impact on the physical process.
(7) Recover device logic In order to craft attacks which can manipulate the
process in a specific way, the attacker first needs to gain a copy of the logic
running on the PLCs. This will allow them to know which memory addresses
need to be attacked. For the Siemens ET200S, this is a simple case of directly
reading a function block from the device using the Step7 protocol. This block
will then need to be reverse engineered to recover the logic. For newer Siemens
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network access to the device and knows the exact hardware variant, the logic
can be recovered from the device using the Siemens TIAPortal software.
Whilst reverse engineering the logic may prove difficult, especially if the
attacker has no knowledge of the underlying physical process, it is possible to
craft attacks using the recovered logic [8].
(8) Exploit RTU to blind control room To exploit the RTU, we developed
a zero-day exploit and followed standard disclosure practices for vendor notifi-
cation. Details can be found in a Schneider report [3]. Through this exploit, we
load a new configuration to the device in order to change the devices IP address.
This causes ClearSCADA to lose its connection to the device, meaning that the
control room no longer has a view of the system.
(9) Manipulate process and blind HMI The final step is to directly interact
with the PLC to interfere with the physical process, and cause the HMI to display
incorrect information. This is achieved by repeatedly writing to specific memory
addresses within the PLC logic, which overwrites variables used by the logic and
specific tags on the PLC. The targeted elements are the state of the pressure
alarm, and the pump speed. The pump speed is increased to 95% (above the
standard operation of 80%). We also overwrite the variable that is read by the
HMI to display the pump speed. Writing is achieved using the S7 protocol, with
packets sent repeatedly at a high rate, faster than the PLCs cycle time.
This has the effect that the pump speed increases to 90% which causes the
system pressure to exceed the usual safety limit, however the pressure alarm
does not trigger the safety cutoff and the pump continues to run. Meanwhile,
the HMI displays no pressure alarm and continues to indicate a pump speed of
80%.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed insights from a multi-year programme of research
studying cyber security risks in critical infrastructures from a socio-technical
perspective—taking into account both technical vulnerabilities and human &
organisational factors. Our work, to date, has shown that effective assessment
and management of such risks requires an understanding of how stakeholders
make security decisions and how latent design conditions manifesting down the
line as a consequence of these decisions impact the cyber security of such infras-
tructure. Our work has also shown that one must consider the complexity arising
from the melting pot that represents the devices and systems that are deployed
within critical infrastructures. Given their long lifespan the infrastructure is a
combination of devices, platforms and protocols from diverse manufacturers. Not
only so, there are a range of legacy and non-legacy devices and systems in op-
eration in conjunction within each other. The need for business efficiencies and
remote maintenance and updates is leading to the infrastructure becoming more
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highly connected to external systems and newer devices and platforms such as
IIoT. This leads an increased attack surface that can be exploited by attackers
to compromise security and hence safety as well as impact critical services to
large swathes of the population. Studying such issues – from a socio-technical
perspective – is a key part of our on-going and future work.
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